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Digital Deception: The Undue Influence Enhancement in the
Sentencing of Cyber-Predators Caught in Online Sting
Operations
MacKenzie Fillow'
I.

Introduction

Kacie Woody of Faulkner County, Arkansas was twelve
years old the summer of 2002.2 That's when Kacie met a boy in an
Internet chat room for Christian teenagers. 3 The boy said his name
was Dave Fagen.4 Dave's online profile indicated he was eighteen
and from San Diego, California.5 Dave and Kacie soon discovered
they had something in common: they both had family members
who had been involved in terrible car accidents. 6 Kacie's mother
died in a car accident when she was seven years old.7 Dave's aunt
had recently been in a car accident and was in a coma. 8 Kacie and9
Dave chatted online by an instant messaging program for months.
They even talked on the phone numerous times. °
Dave lived in California, but he was not eighteen.1 His
name was David Fuller, and he was forty-seven years old. 12 He
was married with two kids.' 3 Fuller did not have an aunt in a
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005.
2 Cathy Frye, Caught in the Web, Second of FourParts: Entryway to Danger,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 15, 2003, at 1.
3Cathy Frye, Caught in the Web, First of FourParts: Evil at the Door,ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,

Dec. 14, 2003, at 1.

4 See Cathy Frye, Caught in the Web, Third of FourParts: Running Out of
Time, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 2003, at 1.

56 Frye, supra note 3.
d.
7id.
8id.

9Id.
10id.

11
Frye, supra note 4.
2
1 Id
"
13

See id.
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14
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Police believe he made up that story to gain Kacie's
Fuller flew from California to Arkansas on October 11,

2002, and again on November 4, 2002.16 On one of these trips he
rented a storage unit. 7 Police also believe Fuller spied on Kacie
during these trips.' 8 He may have seen Kacie crowned seventh
grade queen at her school's fall festival during one weekend he
was in town. 19
On December 3, 2002, Kacie was chatting online with
another Internet friend named Scott. 20 At 9:41 pm, Kacie abruptly

stopped responding to Scott's instant messages. 2 1 Scott became
concerned. When Kacie's brother got home around 11:30 pm, he
could not find Kacie and the police were called.23 The next day,
the police found Fuller and Kacie in a van in the locked storage
unit Fuller rented weeks before.24 Fuller had raped and killed
Kacie. 25 Fuller shot himself just as law enforcement prepared to
apprehend him.26 Kacie was thirteen years old when she was
killed.27
Kacie's story demonstrates how easy it is to meet and
mislead children on the Internet. According to a study by the
National Center for Education Statistics, fifty-nine percent of
children ages five to seventeen use the Internet.28 Close to eighty
14 See Cathy Frye, Caught in the Web, Last of FourParts: But Not Forgotten,
ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
15
Id.
16 id.
17

Dec. 17, 2003, at 1.

See id.

18 Id.
19

Id.

20

See Frye, supranote 3.

21

Id

22

Id.
Id.
Frye, supra note 14.
Id.

23
24
25

26 Id.
27

Id.

28

Rachel Davis, Kids Rule in World of Computers, FLORIDA

(Jacksonville), Dec. 4, 2003, at A-i;

TIMES-UNION

MATTHEW DEBELL & CHRIS CHAPMAN,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE
BY CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN 2001 4 (2003), http://nces.ed.gov/

SPRING
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Internet. 29

A Nielsen survey estimated
percent of teens use the
twenty-seven million American children ages two to seventeen
used the Internet from home during September 2003.30 The same
anonymity that enables cyber-predators to communicate easily
with children, however, also allows law enforcement to catch some
criminals. Indeed, law enforcement officers have found that by
using digital deception-entering chat rooms under the assumed
identities of teens and pre-teens-they are better able to investigate
and catch cyber-predators. 3 1
When cyber-predators are caught through online sting
operations and found guilty of the underlying statutory violation,3 2
judges must look to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Sentencing Guidelines") to determine what sentences offenders
will serve. 3 3 One of the sentencing guidelines applicable to such
cases is section 2A3.2, "Criminal Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under
the Age of Sixteen Years (Statutory Rape) or Attempt to Commit
Such Acts." 34 Section 2A3.2 is intended to apply to consensual
acts between the defendant and the victim which are illegal due to

pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2004014 (last visited Apr. 1, 2004) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
29 Id.
30 Dan Horn, Kids Here Near Top in Using Internet, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Oct. 23, 2003, at IA; Press Release, Neilsen/NetRatings, Kids Account for One
Out of Five Internet Surfers in the U.S. (Oct. 21, 2003), http://www.nielsennetra tings.com/pr/pr_031021 us.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
31See Michael Schrage, We Can Trap More Crooks With a Net Full of Honey,
WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2004, at B01.
32 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2003) (prohibiting persuading or attempting to persuade
a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity); Id.§ 2423(b) (prohibiting
traveling or attempted interstate travel for the purposes of engaging in criminal
sexual acts with a minor).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3553. The Sentencing Guidelines are not suggestions for judges;
they must be followed. Id.The Sentencing Guidelines assign each crime a base
offense level. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2 (2002) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
The base offense level can be increased or decreased based on specific offense
characteristics. Id. § 1(B). The amended offense level, along with the
defendant's criminal history, determines the defendant's sentence. See id.
§34 5(A).
U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2.
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the victim's age.'Section 2A3.2 includes a provision allowing for a
sentencing increase, or "enhancement," when the offender "unduly
influenced the victim." 36 Section 2A3.2 specifically defines
"victim" to include "undercover law enforcement officer." 37
However, whether an online offender can "unduly influence" an
undercover law enforcement officer remains unsettled. In 2002, in
United States v. Root,38 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit said an online offender can "unduly influence" an
undercover law enforcement agent because of the specific
inclusion of undercover officers in the definition of "victim." In
2003, in United States v. Mitchell,39 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit said an online offender cannot "unduly influence"
an undercover officer because the language of the guideline
requires sexual contact to occur before it can be applied. As law
enforcement agencies are increasingly engaging in online sting
operations to catch cyber-predators, 40 the ambiguity of the
guideline will continue to cause judicial confusion.
Section 2A3.2 itself does not answer that question. Even
though one of the primary goals of the Sentencing Guidelines is to
eliminate sentencing disparity, 4 1 imprecise and ambiguous
guidelines like section 2A3.2 allow for disparate interpretations.
Section 2A3.2 does not define "undue influence." Specifically,
section 2A3.2 does not indicate whether the offender need only
exert undue influence, in which case the guideline is punishing the
offender based on his culpability, or if the victim must actually
Sentencing Guidelines for the U.S. Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 7080-01 (Feb. 11,
2000).
36 U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(b)(2)(B).
37
Id. § 2A3.2, cmt. n.1.
18 296 F.3d 1222, 1234 (11th
Cir. 2002).
35

'9
40

353 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2003).

41

U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt. A (1987) (most recently amended 2003).

Schrage, supra note 31, at BO 1 (explaining that the United States, Britain, and
Australia recently began a "global law enforcement initiative" called Operation
Pin: "It uses fake sites and chat rooms to crack down on adults who seek to
purchase child pornography online or to use the Internet to make inappropriate
contact with the underaged .... Operation Pin is intended to deter as well as
entrap." Id.).
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experience and succumb to the offender's influence, which would
mean that the guideline is punishing the offender based on actual
harm caused. To resolve the ambiguity it is necessary to determine
who section 2A3.2 is intended to punish-the offender with
wrongful intent or the offender who actually caused harm.
This Comment explores the ambiguities of section 2A3.2
and analyzes the decisions in Root and Mitchell. Part II discusses
the Root holding that an undercover law enforcement officer can
be "unduly influenced" and the Mitchell holding that an
undercover law enforcement officer cannot be "unduly
influenced." Part III analyzes subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) in the
context of section 2A3.2 and compares it to section 2G 1.1, a
sentencing guideline with similar language. Part III then examines
the legislation that led to the creation of section 2A3.2. This paper
concludes that an online offender can unduly influence an
undercover law enforcement officer for purposes of this guideline,
but the Root court reached this conclusion without a thorough
analysis. Part IV suggests amendments to section 2A3.2 that
would enable courts to apply the enhancement consistently, in
accordance with one of the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines.
SPRING

II.

Two Interpretations of Subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B)

Subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) increases a defendant's
offense level when "a participant otherwise unduly influenced
2
'4
the victim to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.

"Victim"

is defined in section 2A3.2 as "(A) an individual who, except
as provided in subdivision (B), had not attained the age of 16
years; or (B) an undercover law enforcement officer who
represented to a participant that the officer had not attained the
age of 16 years. ' 43 The application notes include a directive to
"closely consider the facts of the case to determine whether a
participant's influence over the victim compromised the
voluntariness of the victim's behavior. 44 The Eleventh and
Seventh Circuits have reached conflicting conclusions about
42

Id. § 2A3.2(b)(2)(B).
Id. § 2A3.2, cmt. n. 1.
44Id. § 2A3.2, cmt. n.4.
43
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whether subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) can apply when the
"victim" is an undercover law enforcement officer.
The issue is whether the courts define "influence" in
subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) from the perspective of a victim or a
defendant. If it is victim-focused, application of the
enhancement will depend on actual harm experienced by the
victim. If it is defendant-focused, application of the
enhancement will depend on the intent and actions, or
culpability, of the defendant. Analysis of the word "victim"
and the phrase "unduly influenced" as used in subsection
2A3.2(b)(2)(B) will be helpful in determining the focus of this
enhancement. Where the "victim" can be a law enforcement
officer, the enhancement must be defendant-focused because
the "victim" will never be harmed. On the other hand, if the
words "unduly influenced" are interpreted to require the victim
to actually do what the defendant wants, the enhancement is
victim-focused because its application depends on whether the
victim succumbed to the defendant's influence. The meaning
of these words is intertwined: both provide clues about the
purpose of the enhancement.

A. UnitedStates v. Root
1. Summary of the Decision
In United States v. Root,45 the defendant struck up an online
conversation with an undercover law enforcement officer posing as
a thirteen-year-old girl named Jenny.46 Over three days, the
defendant chatted with "Jenny" several times, talking to her about
sex and explaining various sexual terms. 47 The defendant traveled
from North Carolina to Georgia to meet "Jenny," where he was
48
a minor
of attempting
to persuade
arrested.
He was sexual
convicted
travel for
the to
activity
and interstate
engage in criminal

4' 296
46

F.3d 1222 (11 th Cir. 2002).

Id. at 1224.

47 Id.
48 id.
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49
purpose of engaging in a criminal sexual act with a minor. The
defendant's offense level for purposes of sentencing was increased
under subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B). 5 °
The Eleventh Circuit gave two primary reasons for holding
that an offender can unduly influence a law enforcement officer
under subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B). First, the court pointed to the
specific inclusion of "undercover law enforcement officer" in the
definition of"victim." 5 1 The court noted the Sentencing
Commission's statement that the definition was expanded to ensure
that offenders arrested as a result of undercover operations are
appropriately punished.52 The court determined that it would be
illogical to allow "victim" to mean "undercover law enforcement
officer" and then
require that the offender actually overcome the
53
will.
officer's
Second, the court decided that subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B)
focuses on the offender's conduct, not the victim's response to or
feelings about the offender's conduct.54 The court came to this
conclusion because section 2A3.2 specifically applies to violations
of statutes that prohibit mere attempts of criminal activity.55
Because section 2A3.2 specifically applies to defendants who are
convicted of attempt crimes, the court determined that a finding of
actual sexual abuse was not required for the enhanced sentencing
penalties to apply.56 If actual sexual abuse is not required, the
court reasoned that the sentencing guideline must focus on the
offender's culpability rather than actual harm caused to the
SPRING

49

50

1d. at

1226-27.

1d. at 1227.
5 Id. at 1233.
52 Id. at 1234. The Commission made the amendment to "clarify[] that 'victim'
includes an undercover police officer who represents to the perpetrator of the
offense that the officer was under the age of 16 years. This change was made to
ensure that offenders who are apprehended in an undercover operation are
appropriately punished." U.S.S.G. app. C, at 49 (2002).
53Root, 296 F.3d at 1234.
54 id.
55Section 2A3.2 applies to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), which is "an
offense requiring a non-sexual action such as travel with a specific intent to
commit a sex crime." Id.
56

id.
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victim.57

To find that the defendant acted to unduly influence the
victim, the Root court looked at the defendant's behavior."' The
court found that Root used three types of power in his actions to
unduly influence the victim: increased knowledge, persuasive
power, and superior resources. 59 By explaining sexual acts and
terms to the victim, Root used increased knowledge to influence
the victim to have sex with him. 60 By telling the victim that other
thirteen-year-old girls engage in these acts and that he would be
"gentle" with her, Root used persuasive powers to influence the
victim to have sex with him. 6 1 By offering to pay for the victim to
see a movie and offering the victim the use of his car and compact
discs, Root used superior resources to influence the victim to have
sex with him. 62 The court concluded these63actions were sufficient
to find Root unduly influenced the victim.

2. Weaknesses of the Decision
Section 2A3.2 includes a comment from the Sentencing
Commission to "consider the facts of the case to determine
whether a participant's influence over the victim compromised the
voluntariness of the victim's behavior. '64 This directive conflicts
with the definition of "victim" provided in the sentencing
guideline. While the Root court briefly mentioned this directive
from the Sentencing Commission, 65 it failed to explain either how
57id.
58

Id. at 1235. Root thought he was talking to a thirteen-year-old girl named

Jenny. Id.at 1224. In reality, "Jenny" was an investigator with a sheriffs
department in Georgia. Id.
51Id. at 1235-36.
60 Id. at 1235 (explaining that Root described "masturbation, ejaculation,
orgasms, cunnilingus, fellatio, manual penetration and sexual intercourse" to
Jenny).
61 Id. at 1235-36. Root told Jenny "that touching a man's genitalia 'gives you
Id. at 1225.
power."'
62
Id. at 1236.
63
1d. at 1235.
64
65

U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2, cmt. n.4 (2002).
Root, 296 F.3d at 1232-33.
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this
or
why
this directive fits into its interpretation of the guideline
directive does not lead to another outcome. This directive suggests
that the guideline is victim-focused because it specifically instructs
the court to look at how the offender's conduct has affected the
victim. The court could have explained why it did not find this
statement persuasive, but it failed to do so.
SPRING

B. United States v. Mitchell
1. Summary of the Decision
In United States v. Mitchell,66 the Seventh Circuit
interpreted the same sentencing guideline but came to a different
conclusion than the Root court. The defendant in Mitchell, who
was fifty years old, communicated online with an undercover law
enforcement officer posing as a fourteen-year-old girl named
Dena. 67 The defendant explained many sexual terms and acts to
"Dena. ' 68 He was arrested after he traveled from Indiana to
Illinois to meet "Dena., 69 The defendant pled guilty to interstate
y°
travel for the purpose of engaging in a criminal sexual act.
The Mitchell court found that the "plain language" of
subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) does not allow enhancement where the
"victim" is an undercover law enforcement officer. 7 1 In fact, the
court went even further, concluding that the undue influence
enhancement does not apply at all to attempt crimes. 72 "[T]he
enhancement cannot apply where the offender and victim have not
engaged in illicit sexual conduct." 73 The court based this
conclusion on the fact that the Sentencing Commission wrote the
guideline in the past tense which the court interpreted as requiring
74
the defendant to succeed in his attempt to influence the victim.
66 353 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2003).
67 Id.at 553-54.
68
69

Id.at 554.
Id. at 553-54.

70 Id.at 555.
71
Id.at 554.
72
Id.at 557.
73 Id.
7

4Id.at 556.
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Consequently, the court reasoned that the enhancement could not
apply to cases where
the victim is not actually convinced to engage
7/
relations.
in sexual
The court then listed several definitions of "undue
influence" from a variety of sources, finding that civil case law, a
contracts treatise, and American Jurisprudence 2d each require that
the influencer succeed in altering the behavior of the target.76 The
court analyzed the word "influence" and the phrase "undue
influence" by looking to their definitions in the Oxford English
Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, respectively. 77 Based on
these readings and definitions, the court concluded that "there can
be no influence
where the object of the influence has not acted
78
accordingly.
The court concluded that the guideline is focused on the
behavior of the victim because of the application note instructing
courts to consider whether the offender's influence of the victim
compromised the voluntariness of the victim's behavior.7 9 The
court noted that the victims in online sting operations "are created
and manipulated by the police. ' 8° Because the court found the
enhancement to be victim-focused, the court concluded that the
enhancement cannot apply in these cases where the age,
characteristics, and actions of the victim are decided by law
enforcement.81
The court criticized Root as ignoring the plain meaning of
the guideline and the corresponding commentary. 82 The court
acknowledged that the guideline defines "victim" to include "law
75id.

76 Id.at 557-58.
77 Id. at 558. "The Oxford English Dictionary defines influence as 'to affect the
mind or action of; to move or induce by influence; sometimes especially to
move by improper or undue influence' Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.
1989)." Id. "Black's Law Dictionary contains several paragraphs on 'undue
influence' each of which defines the term, in part, based on the effect of the
influence on the target." Id.
78 id.
79
80 Id.at 557.
Id.at 561.
81 id
82
Id.at 561-62.
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enforcement officer," but stated that the wording of the guideline
still requires that the victim be unduly influenced,83which requires
that the prohibited sexual conduct actually occur.
SPRING

2. Weaknesses of the Decision
The Mitchell court claimed that the "plain language" of
section 2A3.2 supports its holding, but this does not appear to be
true. The court relies on the past tense language of subsection
2A3.2(b)(2)(B), concluding that this requires the influencer to have
convinced the victim to engage in a sex act. 84 Yet, as the dissent
points out, the past tense language could just as easily "mean that
the influence lies in the past," not that the "sexual relations
occurred in the past." 85 Even if the use of past tense does require
the act to have been completed, the act here is the influence, not
the sexual contact.
The Mitchell court seemed to be concerned with law
enforcement's ability to manipulate the victim's characteristics so
that subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) would always apply in online sting
operations. 86 But even if the enhancement is found to be victimfocused, it is still the offender's behavior, not the victim's
characteristics, which would be relevant in the application of the
enhancement. The enhancement would not apply to mere
solicitations, where the offender did not take extra steps to
convince the victim to engage in sexual activity. The enhancement
would apply, however, where the offender went beyond
solicitation and attempted to convince or persuade the victim to
engage in sexual activity.
The court also placed great weight on the use of the phrase
"undue influence" in the civil law context, which requires that the
influencer accomplish his goal.87 However, incorporating this civil
law requirement into criminal law provisions is risky as it could
eliminate attempt liability altogether. Civil law requires the
8

3Id. at 559.
4Id. at 557.
85 Id. at 564 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 561.
87
Id. at 557-58.
8
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influencer to be successful in influencing a victim because if he is
not, there is no injury and can be no damages. Civil law is
centered on the concept of damages and making an injured person
whole. 88 But section 2A3.2 is a criminal law provision, and
criminal law punishes attempts. 89 In fact, the criminal statute
violated in Root and Mitchell, to which section 2A3.2 applies,
specifically punishes attempt violations as well as actual
violations.90 "[C]riminal law is distinguished by its punitive
purposes ... [and] its concern with the blameworthiness of the

defendant ....In contrast, the civil law is defined as a
compensatory scheme, focusing on damage rather than on
blameworthiness." 91 Thus, requiring the offender to have
succeeded in completing a sex act with the victim eliminates the
essential distinction between civil and criminal law.
Once we strip away what civil common law has added to
the words "unduly influenced," we can do what the Mitchell court
claims to have done: look at the plain language of the guideline.
92
"Undue" means "more than necessary; not proper; illegal.
"Influence" means "power exerted over others. To affect, modify
or act upon by physical, mental or moral power, especially in some
gentle, subtle, and gradual way." 93 "Undue influence" can mean
what the Mitchell court held it to mean. However, the word "or" in
the definition of "influence" indicates "undue influence" can also
mean improper or illegal acts that do not necessarily affect or
modify the subject. Further analysis is necessary to determine
which meaning was intended in section 2A3.2.
III.

Analysis
After analyzing subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) in context and

88

See Paul H. Robinson, Symposium: The Criminal-CivilDistinctionand the

Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REv. 201, 206 (1996).
89 Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations
and Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477,479 (2004).
90 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2003).
91Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The MiddlegroundBetween
Criminaland Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1799 (1992).
92 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1528 (6th ed.
1990).
93
Id.at 779.
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in light of its legislative history, this paper concludes that the
Sentencing Commission and Congress intended subsection
2A3.2(b)(2)(B) to apply when the "victim" is an undercover law
enforcement officer. Under this interpretation, the offender will
receive a harsher sentence due to his culpability. The intent of
Congress and the Commission in amending this guideline was to
punish offender culpability, and this construction best
accomplishes that intent. 94 The enhancement will not apply to
truly consensual acts between a defendant and a victim, where the
victim was completely willing from the very beginning. It will
apply, however, where the defendant influences or attempts to
influence a victim to engage in prohibited sexual acts.
SPRING

A. Ambiguity
The ambiguity of section 2A3.2 has caused the Seventh and
Eleventh circuits to split on this issue. Ambiguity exists in
95
language "if reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning."
Both the Root court and the Mitchell court's interpretations are
94 While the Sentencing Commission and Congress intended for subsection

2A3.2(b)(2)(B) to apply when the victim is a law enforcement officer, that does
not necessarily mean that it should apply when the victim is a law enforcement
officer. In almost all cases where this enhancement is applied and the victim is
an undercover law enforcement officer, another enhancement will also apply:
"If a computer or an Internet-access device was used to persuade, induce, entice,
or coerce the victim to engage in prohibited sexual conduct ...increase by two
levels." U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(b)(3) (2002). If both provisions will almost always
apply to these sting operations, it may appear to be double counting, which is
not permitted. Double counting "occurs when the same conduct on the part of
the defendant is used to support separate increases under separate enhancement
provisions which necessarily overlap, are indistinct, and serve identical
purposes." United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir. 1997).
Applying the computer enhancement and the undue influence enhancement will
not constitute double counting under this definition. While there will be some
overlap in applying both of these provisions, the same conduct is not being
punished by both enhancements. Use of a computer and undue influence are
two different actions, being punished by two different enhancements. The
enhancements serve different purposes, to deter use of a computer to meet
children and to deter the exertion of undue influence.
95 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 114 (2001) (citing State ex rel. Angela M.W.
v.
Kruzicki, 561 N.W. 2d 729 (Wis. 1997)).
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reasonable. On one hand, section 2A3.2 does specifically state that
"victim" can be an undercover law enforcement officer. 96 On the
other hand, section 2A3.2 also requires consideration of whether
the voluntariness of the victim's behavior was compromised. 97
Because reasonable minds can differ as to the meaning of this
guideline, it is ambiguous.
When words are ambiguous courts often look for
98
contextual clues and legislative intent to resolve the ambiguity.
Because subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) is ambiguous as to who can be
a victim, the courts should have looked to its context, including
similar guidelines for comparison, and to the intent of Congress
and the Commission in promulgating the guideline. Looking at
context and legislative intent can help courts apply this guideline
properly and resolve the ambiguity.
B. Context
As Judge Learned Hand wrote, "There is no more likely
way to misapprehend the meaning of language-be it in a
constitution, a statute, a will or a contract-than to read the words
literally, forgetting the object which the document as a whole is
meant to secure." Most words have more than one meaning; 100
context helps us determine which particular meaning is
intended.10 1
1. "Victim" in Other Parts of § 2A3.2
Structurally, section 2A3.2 has numerous problems, some
96 U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2, cmt.
97 Id. § 2A3.2, cmt. n.4.
98

n.1.

See Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'r, 311 F.3d 1178, 1184 (2002) (stating that

when words are ambiguous, context clarifies which meaning was intended);
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (analyzing legislative intent in a sex offender
registration statute).
99 Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir.
1947).
100 Ctr. for Blood Research, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir.
2002).
'o1 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,466 (1stCir. 2001).
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of which neither Root nor Mitchell addresses. The guideline uses
the word "victim" eight times. 102 The word "minor" is found only
in the title.'0 3 Although the commentary defines "victim" to
include law enforcement officers, 10 4 not every provision that uses
the word "victim" can be applied when the victim is a law
enforcement officer. Two provisions, subsections 2A3.2(b)(1) and
2A3.2(c), illustrate why it would be illogical to allow "victim" to
mean "law enforcement officer" every time it is used.
Subsection 2A3.2(b)(1) increases the sentence "[i]f the
victim was in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the
defendant."' 0 5 How could this happen when the "victim" is a law
enforcement officer? Even if there were an undercover law
enforcement officer who actually looks young enough to convince
an offender that he/she is under sixteen years old, the offender
would never have custody or supervisory control of the officer. In
spite of the fact that the guideline defines "victim" to include law
enforcement and this provision uses the word "victim," this
enhancement can never apply when the "victim" is an undercover
law enforcement officer.
Another provision, subsection 2A3.2(c), instructs judges to
apply a different sentencing guideline, section 2A3.1, "if the victim
had not attained the age of 12 years."' 6 There are two reasons
subsection 2A3.2(c) cannot be used when the "victim" is a law
enforcement officer. First, there are no law enforcement officers
under age twelve. Second, even if the age of the fictitious victim,
who could be under the age of twelve, were applied, section 2A3.1
does not contain a similar definition of "victim" to include law
enforcement officers. The absence of such a definition when it is
present elsewhere indicates the Sentencing Commission did not
intend for section 2A3.1 to apply unless an actual minor is
involved. This means the word "victim" in subsection 2A3.2(c),
which cross-references section 2A3.1, cannot be interpreted to
SPRING

102

U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2 (2002).

103

Id. The guideline is titled, "Criminal Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under the

Age
1 4 of Sixteen Years (Statutory Rape) or Attempt to Commit Such Acts."
Id. § 2A3.2, cmt. n.1.
0 Id. § 2A3.2(b)(1).
106

Id. § 2A3.2(c).
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include undercover law enforcement officers.
These two examples illustrate that it would be illogical to
allow every use of the word "victim" in section 2A3.2 to include
law enforcement officers.' 07 Thus, reliance on the guideline's
general definition of "victim" is not enough to find that any
particular use of the word "victim" can include undercover law
enforcement officers. Additional analysis is needed to determine
whether the word "victim" in subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) should
include undercover law enforcement officers. A comparison to
another guideline that similarly defines "victim" to include law
enforcement officers and an understanding of legislative intent
provide additional information.
2. Other Sentencing Guidelines: U.S.S.G.
Section 2G1.1
Because "language 'cannot be sequestered from its
surroundings,' 10 8 the use of the word "victim" in other parts of the
Sentencing Guidelines is also relevant because it provides
additional information about the Commission's understanding of
the word. In particular, section 2G 1.1, "Promoting A Commercial
Sex Act or Prohibited Sexual Conduct," also defines "victim" to
107

This reasoning may help resolve another conflict between Root and Mitchell,

which involved the rebuttable presumption note about subsection
2A3.2(b)(2)(B). The application note provides a rebuttable presumption of
"undue influence" where the offender is ten years older than the victim..
U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2 cmt. n. 4. The Root Court applied this presumption, using the
age of the fictitious child as opposed to the officer to find a ten-year difference.
United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1234-36 (11th Cir. 2002). The Mitchell
Court rejected this interpretation, finding it would allow the presumption to
apply in every case because the police will make sure the fictitious child is at
least ten years younger than the offender. United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d
552, 560-61 (7th Cir. 2003). Defining "victim" to mean law enforcement
officer in some provisions but not in others will allow courts to apply the undue
influence enhancement without applying the presumption. Just because
"victim" can mean law enforcement officer in subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) does
not mean that "victim" has to mean law enforcement officer in the rebuttable
presumption provision.
108 Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting
Victor v.
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 16 (1994)).
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9
Section 2G1.1
include "undercover law enforcement officer."'
0
applies to several crimes involving prostitution." Section 2G 1.1
contains many provisions similar to section 2A3.2.111 The
complete definition of "victim" in section 2G 1.1 is
a person transported, persuaded, induced, enticed,
or coerced to engage in, or travel for the purpose of
engaging in, a commercial sex act or prohibited
sexual conduct, whether or not the person consented
to the commercial sex act or prohibited sexual
include an
conduct. Accordingly, "victim" may 12
officer.'
enforcement
law
undercover
This definition of "victim" in section 2G1 .1 is the most
persuasive evidence that the Commission intended subsection
2A3.2(b)(2)(B) to apply when the "victim" is an undercover law
enforcement officer. This definition of "victim" leaves no doubt
that the Sentencing Commission believes an undercover law
enforcement officer may be "persuaded, induced, enticed, or
coerced." If a law enforcement officer can be "persuaded,
induced, enticed, or coerced," there is no reason why he/she could
not be "unduly influenced."
The word "induce" in section 2G1.1 's definition of
"victim" is especially noteworthy. Induce means "to bring on or
about, to affect, cause, to influence to an act or course of
conduct."' 13 "Induce," even more so than "influence," seems to
require the act to have actually occurred. Yet section 2G1.1
definitively shows that the Sentencing Commission believes a law
enforcement officer may be "induced."'1 14 It may be that the
Sentencing Commission used these words incorrectly, but this
nevertheless demonstrates that the Sentencing Commission
intended to focus on the act of the offender and not the act's effect
on the victim.
Section 2G 1.1 also demonstrates the Sentencing
SPRING

109
0

U.S.S.G. § 2Gl.1 cmt. n.1.

Id. § 2G1.1 cmt.
...
See id.§ 2G1.1.
112 See id. § 2G1.1 cmt. n.1.
113 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 775 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
14
1 See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 cmt.
n.1.
"
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Commission's ability to make distinctions between victims who
can be law enforcement officers and victims who must be actual
minors. "5 Section 2G1.1 not only has a definition of "victim"
as
116
described above, but it also includes a definition of "minor."
Under section 2G 1.1, a minor is "an individual who had not
attained the age of 18 years." ' 1 7 Section 2G 1.1 uses the word
"minor" in some provisions118 and "victim" in others.' 19 This
differentiation between "minor" and "victim" in section 2G 1.1
demonstrates that if the Sentencing Commission intended to
specifically exclude law enforcement officers from
2A3.2(b)(2)(B), it knew how to do so.
C. Legislative Intent
Prior to 2000, section 2A3.2 did not provide for any
enhancement for unduly influencing the victim and did not
mention undercover law enforcement officers. 20 In 1998,
Congress passed the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators
Act (the Act).
The Act amended various provisions of title 18 of
the United States Code, including the provision that prohibits
interstate travel for the purposes of engaging in criminal sex with a
minor. 122 The Act instructed the Sentencing Commission to
increase sentences for violations of that provision.' 23 Section
115While

it is clear from section 2G1.1 that the Commission knows how to make
such a distinction, it is less clear that the Commission knows how to use the
distinction properly to clarify the guidelines. That, however, is the subject for
another paper.
116
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 cmt. n.1.
117 Id

E.g., id. §§ 2G1.1(a)(1), 2G1.1(b)(4)(A), 2G1.1(b)(4)(B), 2G1.1(b)(5).
E.g., id. §§ 2G1.1 (b)(2), 2G1.1 (b)(3)(A), 2G1.1 (b)(3)(B).
120 The 1987 version of section 2A3.2 read, in its entirety: "Criminal Sexual
118

19

Abuse of a Minor (Statutory Rape) or Attempt to Commit Such Acts (a) Base
Offense Level: 15(b) Specific Offense Characteristic (1) If the victim was in
the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant, increase by 1 level."
121 Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998. Pub. L. No. 105314,
112 Stat. § 2974 (codified as amended in scattered sections 18 U.S.C.).
122
id.

123

Id. Interstate travel to have criminal sex with a minor is prohibited by 18

U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2003). Both Root and Mitchell were convicted under
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this violation'
Act. 125
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and

2A3.2 is the sentencing guideline applicable to
was amended to its current form as a result of this
Congress enacted this legislation primarily in response to
cyber-predator use of the Internet to meet minors. 126 The
legislative history is filled with references to adults meeting
children online and then sexually abusing and/or murdering
them. 127 The House noted, "'Cyber-predators' often 'cruise' the
Internet in search of lonely, rebellious, or trusting young
people. 128 The House also was concerned that
the recidivism rates for [child sex] offenders are 10
times higher than other types of criminal
offenders.... Law enforcement urged Congress to
provide them with the tools necessary to investigate
and bring to justice those individuals who prey on
our nation's children.... Those who commit these
heinous crimes must be sent a message that they
will be punished swiftly and severely. [The
Sexual Predators Act]
Protection of Children1from
29
intends to do just that.
The House version of the Act contained an amendment that

would have made illegal "travels in interstate commerce ... for the

purpose of engaging in any sexual activity, with another person
who has not attained the age of 18 years or who has been
representedto the traveler or conspiratoras not having attained
the age of 18years.' 130 The Senate specifically rejected this
amendment.' 1 It found that the purpose of the House's proposed
§ 2423(b). United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (1 1th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2003). Section 2A3.2 is
the sentencing guideline applicable to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2003).
124 U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(a).
125

Id. app. C, amend. 592.

126

144 CONG. REC. 12,257 (1998).
See id.; 144 CONG. REC. 10,566 (1998); H.R. REP. 105-557 (1998), reprinted

127

in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678.
128 H.R. REP. No. 105-557, at 11-12 (1998), reprintedin 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N.

678, 680.
129Id. at

12.

130 H.R. 3494, 105th Cong. § 202 (1998) (emphasis added).
131144 CONG. REc. 12,257 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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amendment was "to make clear that the targets of sting operations
are not relieved of criminal liability merely because their intended
132
victim turned out to be an undercover agent and not a child.'
The Senate thought this amendment was unnecessary, stating:
The new "sting" provisions addressed a problem that
simply does not currently exist: no court has ever
endorsed an impossibility defense along the lines
anticipated by the House bill. The creation of a
special "sting" provision in this one area could
unintentionally harm law enforcement interests by
lending credence to impossibility defenses raised in
other sting and undercover situations.133
Yet the Mitchell court's refusal to apply subsection
2A3.2(b)(2)(B) when the sexual act never occurred is essentially
an incorporation of the impossibility defense. Factual
impossibility occurs when "the actor's objective [is] forbidden by
the criminal law [and] the actor [is] prevented from reaching that
objective due to circumstances unknown to him." 134 This seems to
be the case in Root and Mitchell. The defendants' objectives were
to have sex with a minor, which is clearly prohibited by criminal
law. 135 The defendants were prevented from reaching their goals
because, unknown to them, the "minors" were actually undercover
law enforcement officers. 136 In addition to the Senate's explicit
rejection of impossibility as a defense to these underlying crimes,
it is the "virtually undisputed rule that factual impossibility is not a
37
defense" to liability for attempt crimes.
While the Senate's rejection of the defense involved
liability for attempted violations of the underlying statute and not
the Sentencing Guidelines, it demonstrates Congress'
understanding that impossibility cannot serve as a defense for
132 id.

133 Id.
134 21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 178 (1998).

18 U.S.C. §§ 2422-23 (2003).
United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Root,
296 F.3d 1222, 1224 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
137 Rogers, supra note 89, at 494 (citing various state and
federal courts, the
Model Penal Code, and Dressler's Understanding Criminal Law).
135

136
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attempted sexual abuse of a minor. However, the Mitchell court
refused to apply the enhancement because the offender was
prevented from reaching his objective due to circumstances
unknown to him.' 38 In effect, the Mitchell court has incorporated a
defense all courts and Congress specifically reject.
Congress' rejection of the impossibility defense also
demonstrates that the Act was intended to punish culpability, rather
than the harm caused to the victim. By specifically accepting the
possibility that cyber-predators may be caught in online sting
operations by undercover law enforcement officers, Congress has
made clear that it is not harm caused that should be punished
because there will never be actual harm to a victim in these cases.
Rather, it is the wrongful intent of the offender which should be
punished. Since section 2A3.2 is the means by which punishment
under the Act is imposed, it should consequently be interpreted as
focused on offender culpability. Congress intends for offenders to
be punished harshly regardless of whether the "victim" is a child or
an undercover agent.139
D. The Rule of Lenity
Under the rule of lenity, penal statutes should be strictly
construed, with ambiguities being resolved in the defendant's
favor. 140 However, a strict construction of this guideline does not
require a court to interpret subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) as focusing
on the victim's behavior because an alternate construction is also
reasonable. Construing subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) as focusing on
the offender's culpability is a reasonable interpretation of the
guideline. Also, a requirement that a court construe a statute
strictly does not necessarily mean the court must interpret the
statute narrowly.14' Courts should interpret the statute to conform

138

Mitchell, 353 F.3d at 557.

"9 144 CONG. REC. 12,257, 12,263 (1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
140 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 197 (2001).
141 In re Banks, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388 (N.C. 1978) ("[W]hile a criminal statute

must be strictly construed, the courts must nevertheless construe it with regard
to the evil which it is intended to suppress.").
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with legislative intent.
The primary purpose of strictly
construing statutes is to make sure it is clear what conduct is
prohibited, ensuring the defendant has notice. 143 In this case, the
conduct that subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) punishes is the defendant's
act of unduly influencing a victim to engage in prohibited sexual
conduct. Whether subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) is interpreted as
focusing on the victim or the offender, the defendant's prohibited
conduct remains the same.
The Root court applied subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B)
correctly, but failed to analyze it thoroughly. Courts should,
however, follow the Root court's decision and apply subsection
2A3.2(b)(2)(B) when the offender attempts to unduly influence the
victim, whether that victim is an actual minor or a law enforcement
officer working undercover.
IV.

Suggestions for Revisions to Section 2A3.2

As previously explained, section 2A3.2 as it currently
exists is ambiguous and imprecise. If section 2A3.2 provided clear
definitions and a sentencing philosophy, the courts of appeals
could have easily dispensed with these cases. Section 2A3.2, as
well as many of the other guidelines, should be revised.
One of the most common complaints about the guidelines
is that they "fail[] to express a coherent philosophy of
punishment."' 144 The purpose of punishing attempts to commit
crimes is to prevent the harm that would be caused and to allow
law enforcement to catch would-be offenders. 145 Severe
punishment for cyber-predators who attempt to unduly influence a
minor but cannot succeed because the "victim" is a law
enforcement officer primarily serves the purposes of
incapacitation 146 and deterrence. 4 7 Severe punishment for attempt
142

Id.

143 United
144

States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding

and Using the Philosophyof the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 19, 20 (2003).
145 Rogers, supra note 89, at 479.
146 See H.R. REP. No. 105-557, at 12 (1998), reprintedin 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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crimes will hopefully prevent cyber-predators from risking their
futures.
The following is a proposed revision to the parts of section
2A3.2 discussed in this paper. Language that has been changed or
added is underlined and brackets have been placed where language
has been omitted completely.
§ 2A3.2. Criminal Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under the
Age of Sixteen Years (Statutory Rape) or Attempt to
Commit Such Acts
SPRING

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the minor was in the custody, care, or
supervisory control of the defendant, increase by 2
levels.
(2) If subsection (b)(1) does not apply; and(B) a participant otherwise acted to unduly
influence[] the victim to engage in prohibited sexual
conduct, increase by 2 levels.
Commentary
Application Notes:
1. Definitions. For purposes of this guideline:
"Victim" means (A) an individual who, except
as provided in subdivision (B), had not attained the age
of 16 years; or (B) an undercover law enforcement
officer who represented to a participant that the officer
had not attained the age of 16 years.
"Minor" means an individual who had not
attained the age of 18 years.
4....
In determining whether subsection (b)(2)(B)
applies, the court should closely consider the facts of
678, 681 (stating that "[r]ecidivism rates for such offenders are 10 times higher
than other types of criminal offenders").
147 See 144 CONG. REC. 10,566 (1998) (stating that the Act
"sends a message to
those individuals who commit these heinous crimes that they will be punished
swiftly and severely") (quoting Rep. Hutchinson).
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the case to determine whether a participant's actions to
influence [] the victim compromised or would have
compromised the voluntariness of the victim's
behavior.

In a case in which a participant is at least 10
years older than the minor, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption, for purposes of subsection (b)(2)(B), that
such participant unduly influenced the minor to engage
in prohibited sexual conduct. In such a case, some
degree of undue influence can be presumed because of
the substantial difference in age between the participant
and the minor. This presumption only applies where
the victim is an actual minor; it does not apply where
the victim is an undercover law enforcement officer.
Sentences imposed under this guideline are
intended to prevent harm to children and to deter
and incapacitate those who pose a danger to
children. In interpreting any provision of this
guideline, a court should be mindful of this purpose.
These changes help resolve the ambiguities in section
2A3.2. By using "minor" in some provisions and "victim" in
others and including definitions of both words, it is clear which
provisions are supposed to apply when the "victim" is an
undercover law enforcement officer and which provisions require
an actual minor. This will prevent courts from having to analyze
each provision to decide if it can apply when the "victim" is an
undercover law enforcement officer.
These changes also make clear that the undue influence
provision is focused on the offender's behavior, not the effect that
behavior has on the victim. By specifying that the enhancement
applies when the offender "acted to unduly influence" the victim,
the question of whether the enhancement is defendant-focused or
victim-focused is eliminated. The provision is explicitly defendant
focused.
This proposal also provides instructions for courts on how
to apply this provision when the "victim" is a law enforcement
officer. The court should look at whether the offender's behavior
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child.14
a
influenced
unduly
have
would
While this proposal addresses many of the ambiguities in
section 2A3.2, it recognizes that it is impossible to anticipate every
problem that may arise in the interpretation of a statute. The
inclusion of a statement of the purpose of the punishment will give
judges more guidance when terms are unclear and help them
interpret the guideline as intended. This will reduce costly and
time-consuming litigation.

V.

Conclusion

The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' conflicting
interpretations of subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) demonstrate that the
guideline is ambiguous as to which "victims" can be law
enforcement officers. This problem stems in part from the
Sentencing Commission's failure to adopt a sentencing philosophy
for judges to consider when interpreting vague or ambiguous
guidelines. Looking to context and legislative intent, however, can
help correct some of these problems. The context of subsection
2A3.2(b)(2)(B) and the legislative history of section 2A3.2
demonstrate that the Sentencing Commission and Congress
intended for this enhancement to apply when the "victim" is an
undercover law enforcement officer.
For Kacie Woody, the Act and sentencing guideline were
of little help. However, encouraging law enforcement to conduct
online sting operations to catch cyber-predators can have a real
impact in preventing similar events in the future. This
encouragement stems from law enforcement's knowledge that their
investigative efforts are rewarded with increased sentencing
punishments for violators. Were it not for the officers in the Root
and Mitchell cases, Root and Mitchell may have caused severe and
long-lasting harm to children. When the punishment received by
these offenders is greater, law enforcement has greater incentive to
conduct such sting operations. Thus, digital deception by law
enforcement, combined with severe punishment of cyber148

The Root court did this when it applied subsection 2A3.2(b)(2)(B). It found

that Root used increased knowledge, persuasive powers, and superior resources
in his attempt to influence the "victim."
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predators, helps to provide greater protection for children.

